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INTRODUCTION 
It is important for all schools to teach about religion in order to foster tolerance and peaceful 
co-existence among diverse groups, especially in the recent social climate of our country and the 
rest of the world. A sufficient educational background might show students that religion is central 
to the identity of many people in the world, and possibly worth exploring further than the school 
context, in order to give them a better understanding of society as a whole. A solely secular 
curriculum is an impoverished education. The Supreme Court has specifically noted, “It might 
well be said that one’s education is not complete without a study of  comparative religion or the 
history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization.”1 While all of this is true, 
it is of equal importance that schools do not cross the Constitutional boundaries set out for the 
protection of citizens’ own religious freedoms, and  refrain from interfering with students’ free 
exercise rights and from unlawfully establishing religious ideals. There is undoubtedly a d elicate 
balance to strike; however, with the help of the Supreme Court, that balance seems to have been 
found by lower courts everywhere. 
In addition to learning about the religious commitments of others, public education that 
includes religion in the curriculum can expose students to the existence of  religious traditions and 
beliefs that they themselves might adopt. The number of people who do not identify with or believe 
in any religion at all has dramatically increased over the last several years in the United States.2 
While every American is entitled to their beliefs, whether they entail belief in a religion or adamant  
denial of such, it might be true that nonbelief is the result of lack of education or exposure to 
religion at an early age. Perhaps if students were given a better understanding of religion at school, 
as parents get busier and have less time for practice and discussion of religion with their children, 
 
1 School Dist. Of Abington Tp., PA v. Schempp , 374 U.S. 203, 255 (1963). 
2 Caroline Mala Corbin, Nonbelievers and Government Speech , 97 IOWA L. REV. 347, 347 (2012). 
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they would be better equipped with tools to make an informed decision about their beliefs or 
consider more possibilities. 
This look at religion in public schools will first include a discussion of the constitutional 
framework laid out by the Supreme Court, cases that have led to that framework, and themes that 
framework has established. Next, the discussion will move to center around decisions on teaching 
the Bible and prayer in public schools and how lower courts have applied the Supreme Court’s 
framework in such cases, followed by a discussion of parental claims of constitutional violation 
by public schools. Then, there will be a section on religion and science and lastly an analysis of 
the framework’s application to the lower court decisions. 
SECTION I: CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 The Supreme Court has established a number of themes regarding the presence of religion 
in public school curriculums. One of the most concrete and sweeping themes, seen first in the early 
1960s, places a prohibition on prayer or devotional bible reading in public schools.3 The theme of 
refraining from these activities touches upon a narrower theme. The narrower theme could be said 
to be that allowing prayer or devotional bible reading in schools, even with a permissive exception 
for non-participants or objectors, is inherently coercive.4 Justice Kennedy in particular voices 
strong objection to the coercive nature of some exercises of religion schools try to implement, 
noting that at a graduation ceremony, for example, prayer chosen by the school principal would 
subject students to pressure to either stand or maintain respectful silence during the invocation and 
benediction, thereby participating in the exercise of religion, even though the school maintains that 
 
3 People of State of Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County, Ill. et al. , 66 S. 
Ct. 461 (1948), Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), School Dist. Of Abington Tp., PA v. Schempp , 374 U.S. 203 
(1963), Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1991), Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
4 Lee, 505 U.S. at. 588, Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
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a graduation ceremony is an optional occasion. 5 While the Supreme Court undoubtedly 
established a prohibition against devotional religious teaching in public schools, the Court also 
insisted that teaching about religion in a secular way is allowed. Teaching about religion in a non-
devotional way is compatible with the prohibitions established by the Court. 
 Another overarching theme created by the Supreme Court in the context of public schools 
and religion is that even non-devotional practices that are still the clear promotion of religion are 
prohibited. For example, schools cannot, under any circumstance, post the Ten Commandments in 
classrooms, as they have an underlying purpose which is plainly religious in nature.6 The Court 
also strictly established a prohibition on the teaching of creation science, even asserting that the 
teaching of creation science impermissibly endorses religion by advancing the religious belief that 
a supernatural being created humankind.7 
 The Supreme Court also created an unmistakable theme in favor of the protection of 
student-initiated religious speech. The Court made clear that forbidding students to meet within 
the school’s forum on the basis of religion amounted to impermissible discrimination.8 The 
school’s forum was a limited one created by the existence of various clubs, and religion could not 
be excluded therefrom.9 It is important to distinguish, however, the difference between the Court’s 
protection of student-initiated religious speech when done privately and in the capacity of a club 
setting, and the prohibition on such student-initiated religious speech at a more public event such 
as a football game. The distinction stems from the Court’s well-established desire to avoid coercion 
of participation in religious exercises for those in attendance at voluntary school functions.10 
 
5 Lee, 505 U.S. at 577. 
6 Stone v. Graham, 499 U.S. 39 (1980),  
7 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), Epperson v. State of Ark., 393 U.S. 97 (1968) 
8 Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens By & Through Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
9 Id. 
10 Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
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 In furtherance of that balance and ensuring the Constitution’s protections are preserved, 
the Supreme Court has developed a framework for lower courts to follow in cases of schools and 
religious materials. Once a party brings a case to a district court, it will be necessary for the school 
or school officials against whom the claims are being brought to prove that there is a secular, non-
devotional purpose of the religious teaching in order to prevail. The way this is accomplished is 
typically through the Lemon test. Lemon v. Kurtzman11 held that statutes providing for state aid to 
or for the benefit of non-public schools were unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment12 since the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the 
statutes involved excessive entanglement between government and religion. Lemon established 
that every analysis in the area of the evils the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent, those 
being ‘sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious 
activity,’13 must begin with consideration of three tests gleaned from the Court’s consideration of 
cases addressing such over the years: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;14 
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”15 Aside 
from the Lemon test, the Court has also recognized the endorsement test as a way to determine 
whether a government entity’s conduct establishes an impermissible endorsement of religion. 
Justice O'Connor first began to articulate the endorsement test as a way to conceptualize Lemon, 
and since 1984, both the Lemon and endorsement tests have been widely used by lower courts to 
determine whether particular state action constitutes impermissible establishment of religion.16 
 
11 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 43 U.S. 602 (1971). 
12 Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; U.S. 
Const. amend. I. 
13 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 43 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (internal citations omitted). 
14 Id. at 612 (internal citations omitted). 
15 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
16 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 400 F. Supp. 2d. 707, 713 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
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SECTION II: DECISIONS ON TEACHING THE BIBLE AND PRAYER IN PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 
 
 The first Supreme Court case addressing the issue of teaching the Bible and prayer in public 
schools was People of State of Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 71, 
Champaign County Ill, et al.17 In McCollum, a resident taxpayer brought an action against the 
Board of Education alleging that religious teachers, employed by private religious groups, were 
permitted to come weekly into the school buildings during the regular hours set apart for secular 
teaching, and then and there for a period of thirty minutes substitute their religious teaching for 
the secular education provided under a compulsory education law the state had in place.18 The 
petitioner alleged that this was a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution.19 The Court relied on the principle set forth in the seminal case of Everson v. Bd. of 
Education, which provided that the Establishment Clause, properly interpreted, had erected a wall 
of separation between Church and State.20 The Court explained that this arrangement by the Board 
of Education presented powerful elements of inherent pressure by the school system in the interest 
of religious sects.21 McCollum noted the Court’s theme of anti-coercion in the context of public 
schools and religion, explaining that even though children are offered an alternative to the religious 
course, this does not “not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to 
conscience and outside the school's domain.”22 Thus, the classes were enjoined.23 
 
17 People of State of Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County Ill, et 
al., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
18 McCollum, 333 U.S. at 205. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 211 citing Everson v. Bd. of Education , 330 U.S. 1 (1947).  
21 Id. at 227. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 231. 
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 While McCollum involved religious groups teaching in the public schools, Engel v. Vitale 
involved the school board itself writing and directing a prayer for students to say.24 In Engel, the 
respondent Board of Education directed the school district’s principal to have its prayer said aloud 
in each class at the beginning of every school day.25 Parents of children that attended the school 
challenged the constitutionality of the prayer on the ground that it violated the Establishment 
Clause.26 The Court held that the state’s program undoubtedly established the religious beliefs 
embodied in the prayer at issue because neither the fact that it can be denominationally neutral nor 
that observance by students can be “voluntary” are enough to free it from the limitations of the 
Establishment Clause.27 The Court explained that violation of the Establishment Clause does not 
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of 
laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce 
nonobserving individuals or not.28 Thus, the prayer was enjoined.29 
 Another Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of Bible teachings in public schools 
was School Dist. Of Abington Tp., PA v. Schempp.30 Abington involved state action that required 
each day in public schools to begin with bible reading in two separate cases.31 In case No. 142, the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania required that “At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be 
read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall 
be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of 
his parent or guardian.”32 A family brought an action to enjoin the Bible reading on the grounds 
 
24 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
25 Id. at 422. 
26 Id. at 423. 
27 Id. at 430. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 436. 
30 School Dist. of Abington Tp., PA v. Schempp , 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
31 Abington, 374 U.S. at 205. 
32 Id. 
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that it violated their constitutional rights.33 In case No. 119, a city school board adopted a rule that 
provided for the holding of opening exercises in the schools of the city, consisting primarily of the 
‘reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's Prayer.’34 
Atheist petitioners brought suit. The Court found that the exercises at issue in both cases and the 
laws requiring them were in violation of the Establishment Clause because the states were 
requiring the selection and reading at the opening of the school day, by the students in unison, and 
the exercises were prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students who were required by 
law to attend school, and that such opening exercises were religious ceremonies and intended to 
be so.35 Like Engel, the Court found that the required exercises were not mitigated by opt-out 
provisions available to students since they were part of compulsory education.36 
 It is intriguing to follow the case law through the years to see how both state and federal 
courts have applied the constitutional framework to real-life scenarios in which these issues have 
presented. One of the first curriculum cases decided after the Supreme Court began laying the 
framework was Sills v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne.37 Like Abington, the Sills court held statutes 
that required Bible reading and the Lord’s Prayer in public schools unconstitutional.38  
There are several cases that came shortly after Abington but before Lemon that applied the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional framework. The next was State Bd. of Ed. v. Board of Ed. of 
Netcong. This case was decided prior to Lemon as well, and thus the test was not applied. In 
Netcong, the Board of Education of a public school had issued a resolution stating that 
“Superintendent of Schools be authorized, empowered and directed to implement the resolution 
 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 211. 
35 Id. at 223. 
36 Id. at 210. 
37 Sills v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 200 A.2d 615 (N.J. Super. 1964). 
38 Id. at 615 (internal citations omitted). 
 
 9 
creating a period for the free exercise of religion in whatever manner, in the exercise of his 
discretion, he considers best under the circumstances.”39 Following the implementation of the 
resolution, students who arrived at school at 7:55 a.m. (immediately prior to the opening of school) 
would utilize the bleachers and listen to a student volunteer read the ‘remarks' (so described by 
defendants) of the chaplain from the Congressional Record, giving the date, volume, number and 
body whose proceedings are being read.”40 The material was of a purely ministerial nature, and 
students were asked to meditate shortly after the reading either about the material or a topic of 
their choice.41 Shortly after implementation, the Board sought to continue the implementation of 
the resolution, despite the recommendation of the Commissioner of the Board to cease and desist 
the resolution due to the Attorney General’s finding that it violated the First Amendment.42 The 
state subsequently decided to file suit. Instead of the Lemon test, the Court applied something 
similar to a balancing approach, suggested by Justice Brennan in Abington, to determine if there 
was an establishment of religion, and if so, whether there was interference with free exercise. 43 
The approach suggested that prima facie evidence of aid in establishment might be overcome by 
proof that the purpose of the aid was to protect free exercise.44 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court explained that the meditation itself was not an issue, but 
the fact that the meditation occurred so closely and basically as part of the prayer prevented the 
two from being evaluated separately.45 The Court also pointed out that if the resolution were not 
an exercise of religion as the defendants insisted, then students should not have been allowed to 
excuse themselves from such important a part of the educational process; permissive 
 




43 State Bd. of Ed. v. Board of Ed. of Netcong , 262 A.2d 21, 26 (Ch. Div. 1970). 
44 Netcong, 262 A.2d 21 at 29. 
45 Id. at 26 (internal citations omitted). 
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nonattendance in a vital school program is not consistent with secularity.46 The Court cited a 
proposition which was restated in McCollum, which said that once a student is excluded from any 
exercise for any reason, particularly one that involves the Bible which others are taught to revere, 
they are excluded from groups of students and are subject to reproach and insult.47 This echoes the 
fear of coercion stated in the Supreme Court precedent as well. It was ultimately found that the 
cease and desist of the resolution had no adverse free-exercise effect on the rights of the students 
who wished to participate, indicating that the balance necessary to allow the religious activity was 
not present, and thus the resolution was ultimately held unconstitutional.48 
 Another pre-Lemon case decided pursuant to the Court’s framework was Vaughn v. Reed.49 
In Vaughn, the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia found weekly 
religious classes in public schools unconstitutional.50 The classes were conducted by teachers sent 
to school by outside private organizations and purported to teach about religion rather that to 
indoctrinate students.51 Students whose parents had not signed cards were excused for study 
period.52 One issue for the Court was whether the classes at issue were actually teaching about 
religion, or whether they were indoctrinating students. The Court explained that if the course were 
being taught within constitutional limits, every student should have been required to attend.53 The 
Court relied on McCollum and Abington in reaching its decision, explaining that in Vaughn as in 
McCollum, children who do not take the program are separated from the other members of the 
class, and this may have resulted in parents who would not have otherwise enrolled their children 
 
46 Id. at 27. 
47 Id. at 30 (internal citations omitted). 
48 Id. at 32. 
49 Vaughn v. Reed, 313 F. Supp. 431(W.D. Va. 1970). 
50 Vaughn, 313 F. Supp. at 434. 
51 Id. at 432. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 433. 
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in the class doing so.54 One of the Court’s main concerns here was unconstitutional societal 
pressures and coercion, which all courts wanted so desperately to be absent in public schools.55 
 Lemon is the predominant test regarding religion in public schools. The first two prongs of 
the Lemon test, that a law must have a legitimate secular purpose, and that it cannot have the 
primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion, came straight from the Abington decision. 
The Court in Abington explained that the test for whether legislation was permissible would be as 
follows: “what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the 
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power 
as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the 
Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion.”56 Lemon added the entanglement prong and created a test with all 
three prongs, and became the predominant test. 
 In the post-Lemon era, in Wiley v. Franklin, a federal district court in Tennessee held that 
a Bible study course violated students’ rights to religious freedom by constituting an excessive 
entanglement between government and religion.57 The school board attempted to argue through its 
policy statement that the study of the Bible was “in relation to its place in the origin of the republic, 
the establishment and development of the public education, the emphasis on individual worth, and 
its pervading influences in the country's government, history, and the very fabric of American 
society.”58 Originally, students who were enrolled in the courses stayed in the classroom for 
instruction while students who were not enrolled were sent to the library and were “omitted from 
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 432. 
56 Abington, 374 U.S. at 222. 
57 Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Tenn. 1979). 
58 Id. at 137. 
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any meaningful classroom assignment or supervision” during the course.59 This changed in 1977-
78 when enrollment would occur only upon written request by students’ parents and students who 
were not enrolled would remain in the regular classroom under the instruction and supervision of 
their regular teacher.60 The federal district court found that the new curriculum’s purpose purported 
to be to provide students with a better understanding of “Biblical characters, stories, settings and 
events that are often referred to in secular literature, history and social commentary or which 
provide themes for some of the better known works of music and art in the Western world ,”61 but 
that there could be little doubt but that the motivation of the Bible Study Committee from its 
inception was religious.62 Thus, the purpose prong of the Lemon test was not met. While Biblical 
interpretation, personal commitment to these beliefs and practices as well as any discussion of the 
religious beliefs and practices of students or of their parents, families or others appeared to be 
avoided, the Court ultimately held that the courses were unconstitutional. The Court reached its 
decision citing propositions from Everson, McCollum, Engel, Epperson and Abington, as well as 
applying the Lemon test in its entirety and holding that the classes advanced the Christian faith and 
inhibited other faiths, and constituted an excessive entanglement between government and 
religion.63  
Like Wiley, the case of Crockett v. Sorenson involved a bible course.64 But here, the federal 
district court chose not to apply the Lemon test and found a Bible course at issue impermissible. 
The Court held the course unconstitutional, while at the same time reiterating the educational value 
of teaching about religion. In Crockett, the public school displayed no authority or supervision 
 
59 Id. at 138. 
60 Id. at 137. 
61 Id. at 141. 
62 Id at 150. 
63 Id. at 151. 
64 Crockett v. Sorenson, 568 F. Supp 1422 (W.D. Va. 1983). 
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over the Bible Teaching in Public Schools group, composed of ministers and representatives of 
Protestant denominations; children who were not enrolled were impermissibly separated, as in 
Vaughn, creating pressure upon students to enroll; and the class consisted of Bible teachings, 
prayers, and hymns. 65 The Court, again, noted the Supreme Court foundations established in 
McCollum, Engel, and others, to explain that religious instruction, in and of itself, is not permitted 
in public schools. The Court then noted the Lemon test, but explained that such a three-prong 
analysis did not seem appropriate in this case, and that the only appropriate inquiry was simply 
whether the Bible teaching program constituted a forbidden religious exercise (i.e., advances 
religion) or a permissible academic program.66 For the reasons stated above, the Court found in 
favor of the former. Thus, the program was enjoined.67 
Gibson v. Lee involved a case in which two Bible history courses were at issue. The federal 
district court ultimately found the Bible History I curriculum, one of the curriculums at issue,  
satisfied the secular purpose prong of Lemon test after modifications of defendant’s counsel were 
implemented, but that the Bible History II class addressing resurrection and miracles could not be 
taught as secular history.68 In its analysis of Bible History I, the Court cited to the Supreme Court’s 
proposition that the Bible has great significance on Western civilization aside from its religious 
significance, which cannot be ignored.69 This furthers the notion that a completely secular 
education is an impoverished one. On the other hand, the Court also emphasized the Supreme 
Court’s vigilance in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary schools 
because of the vulnerable and impressionable nature of elementary-aged children.70 The Court 
 
65 Crockett, 568 F. Supp. 1422 at 1424. 
66 Id. at 1430. 
67 Id. at 1432. 
68 Gibson v. Lee County School Bd., 1 F. Supp.2d 1426 (M.D. Fl. 1998). 
69 Id. at 1421 (internal citations omitted). 
70 Id. at 1432 (internal citations omitted). 
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applied the Lemon test to see if the school had a secular purpose for the course, and made sure that 
this purpose was sincere and not a sham.71 It was held that the adoption of a curriculum ostensibly 
designed to teach history and not religion met the secular purpose requirement.72 Regarding the 
Bible History II class, also at issue, the Court found it difficult to conceive how the account of the 
resurrection or of miracles could be taught as secular history, and thus enjoined the school from 
teaching the course.73 
The case law demonstrates that the courts have consistently approved efforts to teach about 
religion as history and literature, but are committed to rejecting those that promote or appear to 
promote faith. They are also careful to make sure that public-school children are not subject to 
pressures, stigma, or coercion through the implementation of constitutionally violative courses. 
SECTION III: PARENTAL CLAIMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION 
 This section will discuss parental claims of constitutional violation by schools. Courts 
apply the Lemon test as well considering its prongs from the perspective of a reasonable observer 
in order to determine whether public school uses of certain materials violate constitutional 
protections. In some of these cases, the parents also seek an accommodation under the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
One case with claims under both clauses, Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, involved 
an issue surrounding a school board's refusal to remove a book from a sophomore English literature 
curriculum based on plaintiffs' religious objections to the book.74 The state action at issue in Grove 
was school board policy of academic freedom and refusal to remove from the curriculum a book 
 
71 Id. at 1433 (internal citations omitted). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 1434. 
74 Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354 , 753 F.2d 1528, 1532 (9 th Cir. 1985). 
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that offends Grove's religious sensibilities.75 The Court found no violation of the Free Exercise 
Clause because the student was assigned an alternate book to read and was given permission to 
leave the classroom upon discussion of the offensive text.76 Regarding the Establishment Clause, 
the Court explained that it required government neutrality with respect  to religion.77 Plaintiffs 
claimed that that use of The Learning Tree in an English literature class has a primary effect of 
inhibiting their religion, fundamentalist Christianity, and advancing the religion of secular 
humanism.78 The Court found no violation of the Establishment Clause. It applied the Lemon test 
and held that the use of the book was not a religious activity and that it served a secular educational 
function, because the book’s central theme was life, especially racism, from the perspective of a 
particular person, and comment on religion in the book was very minimal.79 The Court cited 
Abington in explaining that to establish a First Amendment violation, one can show that challenged 
state action has a coercive effect that operates against the litigant's practice of his or her religion.80 
Analysis of the second and third prongs of Lemon were thus not necessary, and no Constitutional 
violation was found. 
Textbooks continued to be the controversial element in Smith v. Board of School Com’rs 
of Mobile County, where the Federal Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s inquiry centered 
around whether the use of certain home economics, social studies, and history textbooks had a 
primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion.81 The claimants in Smith believed that the 
forty-four textbooks at issue both advanced a religion and inhibited theistic faiths in violation of 
 
75 Grove, 753 F.2d 1528 at 1533. 
76 Id. at 1534. 
77 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
78 Grove, 753 F.2d at 1534. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1533. 
81 Smith v. Board of School Com’rs of Mobile County , 827 F.2d 684 (11 th Cir. 1987). 
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the Establishment Clause.82 The district court’s finding that the textbooks had violated the 
Constitution was based on the fact that the home economics textbook required students to accept 
as true certain tenets of humanistic psychology, and this was a “manifestation of humanism,” and 
that the history and social studies textbooks failed to include a sufficient discussion of the role of 
religion in history and culture.83 The Eleventh Circuit analyzed whether the use of the books 
impermissibly established and furthered the religion of secular humanism. The Court analyzed this 
by applying the Lemon test to the facts of the case. The parties agreed that there was no question 
of a religious purpose or excessive government entanglement in this case, and the record confirmed 
this.84 Ultimately, the Court concluded that none of these books conveyed a message of 
governmental approval of secular humanism or governmental disapproval of theism.85 With 
respect to the home economics textbook, the Court found that the message conveyed is one of a 
governmental attempt to instill in Alabama public school children such values as independent 
thought, tolerance of diverse views, self-respect, maturity, self-reliance and logical decision-
making, an entirely appropriate secular effect.86 Regarding the social studies and history books, 
the Court found that an objective observer could not conclude from the mere omission of certain 
historical facts regarding religion or the absence of a more thorough discussion of its place in 
modern American society that the State was conveying a message of approval of the religion of 
secular humanism, nor that these omissions themselves discriminated against the very concept of 
religion.87 
 
82 Smith, 827 F.2d at 689. 
83 Id. at 691. 
84 Id. at 690. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 692. 
87 Id. at 693-94. 
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 Reading material was again at issue in Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ. In this case, 
a parent who was a “born again Christian” objected  to a reading material that included mention of 
mental telepathy, claiming that any teaching of such violated her religious beliefs.88 The claim was 
that forcing the students to read materials which violate their religious beliefs was a violation of 
the Free Exercise Clause.89 One of the plaintiffs testified that the books discussed subjects that 
were offensive to her religious beliefs, including evolution, “secular humanism”, “futuristic 
supernaturalism,” pacifism, magic and false views of death, claiming that these subjects taught 
themes such as “Man As God” and other themes of an occult nature.90 The Court referenced the 
Supreme Court’s framework to explain that it violates the Establishment Clause to tailor a public 
school's curriculum to satisfy the principles or prohibitions of any religion.91 The framework was 
also noted to establish that although balance of the treatment of religion in public schools was the 
goal, efforts to achieve that balance desired by any particular group by the addition or deletion of 
religious materials would be a forbidden entanglement of a school creating the very establishment 
of religion sought to be avoided.92 The Court further explained that the issue of concern was not 
what the district court thought to be the fact that materials ‘compelled the plaintiffs to “declare a 
belief,” “communicate by word and sign [their] acceptance” of the ideas presented, or make an 
“affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.’93 Rather, it was the governmental coercion either 
to do or refrain from doing an act that violated one’s religious beliefs repeatedly referenced in the 
framework.94 The Court held that such coercion was not present here.95 
 
88 Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6 th Cir. 1987). 
89 Id. at 1061. 
90 Id. at 1062. 
91 Id. at 1064 (internal citations omitted). 
92 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
93 Id. at 1066. 
94 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
95 Id. at 1070. 
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 In the next case, Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified School Dist., parents sought injunctive 
and declaratory relief against teaching aids used for their children that they claimed promoted 
witchcraft, or the religion of “Wicca”.96 The school board had reviewed the materials in response 
to opposition, but the case still went to litigation.97 The plaintiffs conceded that the text was 
adopted for a secular purpose, and thus the first prong of Lemon was not at issue. The second 
prong, however, is contested. The Court analyzed this prong from the perspective of a reasonable 
person, but considered the more vulnerable age of school-aged children.98 The Court went a step 
further so as to cite Lee v. Weisman, which prohibited graduation prayers, explaining that the 
Supreme Court has applied  an objective standard for public school Establishment Clause 
inquiries, rather than considering the effect disputed materials have on one particular student.99 
Citing Grove, the Court went on to conclude that merely reading, discussing or contemplating 
witches, their behavior, or witchcraft, which was what was required by the disputed texts, cannot 
reasonably be viewed as communicating a message of endorsement. However, the challenged 
sections requiring children to participate in “rituals” of casting spells could potentially be 
problematic because it could have amounted to the school persuading or compelling a student to 
participate in religious exercise, which is exactly what the Supreme Court prohibited in Lee.100 
Ultimately, however, the Court explained that “a practice's mere consistency with or coincidental 
resemblance to a religious practice does not have the primary effect of advancing religion.”101 
Thus, it was determined that a reasonable observer in the position of a school-aged child would 
not view the challenged selections as religious rituals endorsing witchcraft, and thus the second 
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prong of Lemon was satisfied.102 Regarding the third prong, it was held that there was no excessive 
entanglement with religion as plaintiffs argued because the one-time review of the challenged 
material by the school board was not an excessive entanglement.103 Therefore, there was no 
constitutional violation. 
In contrast to these cases, the next curriculum case we see the constitutional framework 
applied to is California Parents for Equalization of Educational Materials v. Nanoon 
(CAPEEM).104 In this case, parents brought an action in the Eastern District of California seeking 
partial summary judgment on its Establishment Clause claim.105 The claim was that a textbook 
which represented Hinduism in a discriminatory and denigrating manner (1) expressed intent to 
model portions of the subject history textbooks after the New Testament; (2) had improper 
influence of religious figures in approving the material addressing Christianity and religious 
considerations that went into evaluating the suggested edits of the textbooks; (3) treated biblical 
narratives as historical facts and biblical events, including miracles, as actual events; and (4) 
contained teachers' materials which purportedly emphasized aspects of indoctrination.106 
 Prior to applying the Lemon test in CAPEEM, the federal district court explained that 
alleged violations of the Establishment Clause in the elementary school setting present heightened 
concerns for courts due to the coercive pressure present in elementary schools.107 The court also 
mentioned how some of the heightened concern is counteracted by the broad discretion school 
boards have in selecting their curriculums, and that the Supreme Court wants courts to get involved 
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the daily operation of a school system only if basic constitutional values are “directly and sharply 
implicate[d].”108  
 The district court applied the Lemon test and found that the school’s purpose in adopting 
the sixth grade history-social science textbooks was patently secular because it was fulfilling its 
obligation to adopt instructional materials for California students that are accurate and consistent 
with the State's learning objectives.109 Regarding the second prong, and whether the textbooks had 
primarily the effect of advancing other religions and inhibiting the Hindu religion, the Court 
evaluated this from the perspective of an objective sixth grader because the Supreme Court 
generally has not relied on expert testimony to determine whether a school practice reasonably 
appears to endorse or inhibit religion.110 The Court concluded that it could not find that the 
textbooks conveyed a message of government endorsement or disapproval of a particular 
religion.111 As for the third prong of Lemon and whether the school displayed an excessive 
entanglement with a particular religion, the Court held that the Plaintiffs’ discussion of history 
books that contain some discussion of religion did not create an excessive entanglement with 
religion.112 Thus, the Court in CAPEEM found no unconstitutional endorsement of religion. This 
case furthers the proposition that the mere teaching about religion does not amount to endorsement, 
safeguarding the principle of the necessary presence of religion in public school curriculums. 
A challenge to the teaching about Islam came in Wood v. Arnold. The material at issue 
contained statements concerning Islamic belief presented as part of a history course, including a 
comparative faith statement, which stated that “Most Muslim’s faith is stronger than the average 
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Christian” and a worksheet requiring students to fill in the blanks with information comprising the 
“Five Pillars” of Islam.113 The Fourth Circuit held that challenged coursework did not violate First 
Amendment rights, because they did not impermissibly endorse any religion and did not compel 
students to profess any belief.114 The Court came to its conclusion using the Lemon test. Regarding 
the first prong, the Court reiterated that the Supreme Court has recognized the secular value of 
studying religion on a comparative basis.115 In Wood, the Court pointed out Islam’s core principals 
were studied among other things (including politics, culture, geography)116 and thus, Lemon’s first 
prong was satisfied.117 The Court also established that the challenged material involved no more 
than having the class read, discuss, and think about Islam, did not suggest that a student should 
adopt those beliefs as her own, and thus the second prong of the test was satisf ied.118 Finally, the 
Court determined that the material did not create an excessive entanglement between government 
and religion, so as to violate the third prong of Lemon, because it did not involve “the government’s 
‘invasive monitoring’ of certain activities in order to prevent religious speech,” or the funding of 
religious schools or instruction.119 Thus, since the challenged material satisfied every prong of the 
Lemon test, the Court ruled that there was no constitutional violation. 
The application of the Lemon test to the above cases evidences that for a court to hold a 
piece of legislation unconstitutional, it must bear an unquestionable constitutional violation. The 
courts seem adamant about refusing to completely remove religious materials from curriculums, 
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as long as they can be found to display useful information about history, culture, and the like, and 
do not mirror indoctrination. 
SECTION IV: RELIGION AND SCIENCE 
 The Supreme Court has addressed religious teaching in the science curriculum in several 
important cases. The first discussing the issue of religion and science was Epperson v. State of 
Ark.120 In Epperson, a public school teacher brought a claim for declaration that Arkansas 
antievolution statutes were void.121 The statute prohibited the teaching in Arkansas public schools 
and universities of the theory that man evolved from other species of life.122 The school 
administration adopted and prescribed a biology textbook containing a chapter on evolution on the 
recommendation of the teachers.123 A teacher faced with the dilemma of whether to teach the 
material brought the action. The Court held that the statute violated the Establishment Clause.124 
The Court further explained that the law selected “from the body of knowledge a particular 
segment which it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular 
religious doctrine.”125 The statutes were therefore struck down. 
 Another Supreme Court case, Edwards v. Aguillard, also discussed religion and evolution 
in public schools.126 In this case, an action was brought challenging the constitutionality of an act, 
the Louisiana Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School 
Intrusion Act. The Act forbid the teaching of the theory of evolution in public elementary schools 
unless accompanied by the teaching of creation science, and did not require the teaching of either 
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theory unless the other were taught.127 The theories of evolution and creation science are statutorily 
defined as “the scientific evidences for [creation or evolution] and inferences from those scientific 
evidences.”128 Louisiana parents, teachers, and religious leaders challenged the act’s 
constitutionality.129 The Court held that the act was facially invalid as violative of the 
Establishment Clause because it lacked secular purpose.130 The Court held this because the act did 
not further its secular stated purpose of “protecting academic freedom” since it did not enhance 
the freedom of teachers to choose what they taught and did not further the goal of ‘teaching all of 
the evidence,’ and because it impermissibly endorsed  religion by advancing the religious belief 
that a supernatural being created humankind.131 
These precedents were applied in a lower court decision involving intelligent design. In 
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Dist.132, parents of school-aged children and member of high 
school science faculty brought action against school district and school board, challenging 
constitutionality of district's policy on teaching of intelligent design in high school biology class, 
which required students to hear a statement mentioning intelligent design as an alternative to 
Darwin's theory of evolution.133 The Court held that district's policy on the teaching of intelligent 
design in a high school biology class, which required students to hear a statement mentioning 
intelligent design as an alternative to Darwin's theory of evolution, amounted to an endorsement 
of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause, violated the Establishment Clause under the 
Lemon test, and violated the freedom of worship provision in Pennsylvania Constitution.134 
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Intelligent design differs from creation science but still holds that a supernatural being designed 
humankind and the world.135 Kitzmiller applied a slightly different version of the Supreme Court’s 
framework than previously discussed. It first applied the endorsement test, and then proceeded to 
apply the Lemon test. The Court discussed how the holding of Epperson constituted a radical 
change in the legal landscape that existed at the time when the Court struck down Arkansas’s 
statutory provision against the teaching of evolution.136 The Court also noted the Edwards decision 
which resulted in a national prohibition of teaching creation science in public schools.137 
Regarding the present issue in Kitzmiller, the Court applied the Lemon test and the endorsement 
test in order to determine whether the teaching of intelligent design was constitutional.138 The 
endorsement test has been described as “a gloss on Lemon” that encompasses both the purpose and 
effects prongs, and looks at whether an objective observer acquainted with a statute would perceive 
it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools.139 The federal district court followed the 
Supreme Court’s lead and used the endorsement test.140 
In order to establish whether or not the endorsement test was satisfied, the Court looked at 
whether an objective observer, in this case a reasonable, objective adult, would perceive official 
support for the religious activity.141 The Court concluded that the religious nature of intelligent 
design would be readily apparent to an objective observer, adult or child, thereby violating the 
endorsement test.142 This was because it was established through an expert witness at trial, that 
intelligent design was not a new scientific argument, but is rather an old religious argument for the 
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existence of God.143 Further, the intelligent design movement describes intelligent design as a 
religious argument, intelligent design’s religious nature is evident because it involves a 
supernatural designer, and intelligent design is a progeny of creationism, which the Supreme Court 
and Constitution forbid teaching as science.144 The Court went on to say that a reasonable, 
objective observer would view the disclaimer given by teachers prior to the teaching of intelligent  
design as a strong official endorsement of religion because such an observer would “perceive the 
text of the disclaimer, ‘enlightened by its context and contemporary legislative history,’ as 
conferring a religious concept on “her school's seal of approval.”145 
The Court also held that the defendants in this case presented no convincing evidence that 
they were motivated by a valid secular purpose, and that their attempt to try to prove so amounted 
to the type of sham specifically prohibited by the Supreme Court.146 The Court found this because 
although the school board tried to assert improving science education as its critical purpose, it 
consulted no scientific materials, contacted no scientists or scientific organizations, failed to 
consider the advice of the district’s science teachers, and relied solely on legal advice from two 
organizations with demonstrably religious, cultural, and legal missions.147 Thus, the first prong of 
the Lemon test was not satisfied. Regarding the effect prong, the Court found that the effect of the 
school’s adoption of the curriculum including intelligent design was to impose a religious view of 
biological origins into the biology course, in violation of the Establishment Clause.148 
SECTION V: ANALYSIS 
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In light of the Constitutional framework laid out by the Supreme Court through various 
ground-breaking cases, the lower courts have complied and applied it notably well. The lower 
courts have drawn parallels between the facts of cases and various Supreme Court decisions, and 
gone further to apply the prongs of the Lemon or endorsement tests to the facts of their specific 
cases in order to determine whether or not there were violations of the Constitution. I agree with 
the way the courts have applied the Supreme Court framework to cases across the country. It seems 
that courts have been able to strike a sensible balance between respect of all religions as well as 
for parents’ and students’ beliefs, albeit some stronger than others, and the courts have been able 
to rule out those cases which contain mostly frivolous arguments or even phobic attitudes towards 
certain religions. 
The courts’ decisions in Bible readings and public schools reflected the lower courts’ 
commitments to safeguarding constitutional values. Particularly, I liked how the courts in Netcong 
and Vaughn noted that if the practices at issue were in fact not religious and educational as the 
defendants insisted, then children would not have been permitted to opt out of so-called 
educational process. These decisions evidenced the court’s concerns about children being coerced 
to take religious classes out of fear of being stigmatized for opting out. As the courts explained, 
this coercion could result from negative attitudes toward students who appear to want to avoid 
classes involving materials such as the Bible, which many are taught to revere. 
Regarding the various decisions explored that included parental claims of Constitutional 
violation, I thought the courts did well at recognizing cases that involved parents that did not want 
their children having any exposure whatsoever to religious beliefs that differed f rom theirs, as 
seemed to be the case in Wood and some others. The religion and science cases showcased the 
relevance of the Lemon test’s purpose prong. It was clear in Kitzmiller that for such topics as 
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creation science and intelligent design the government could not articulate any secular purpose for 
having them taught in public schools, and the courts would not enable that. 
The cases show that mere exposure to religious ideas such as Islam or Christianity differs 
from the suggestion of a scientific theory or fact. This is because in the parental claims cases, texts 
that mentioned religions were held to have value for topics such as politics, history, geography and 
culture, and were not suggestive of any particular religious beliefs as fact, the way that a scientific 
theory can be interpreted as unquestionable, especially to school-aged children who tend to be 
more impressionable than others. The courts’ consideration of the ages of reasonable observers 
when analyzing the parental claims cases furthered the notion that school-aged children were less 
likely to look so deeply into exposure to religions, whereas if they are taught something as a 
scientific theory, it is easier to mistake this as concrete fact. 
On numerous occasions, the courts mentioned the importance of the presence of religion 
in public schools. Although it is clear that religion cannot be taught in a devotional manner within 
curricular materials, students have many ways to practice their religion before, during, and after 
the school day, in a way that involves no interference from government, which is consistent with 
free exercise. Martin J. McMahon’s 1992 article explains the difference between certain prayers 
during lunch, free time, recess, or activity period.149 The article explained that courts have held 
that student prayer in rooms other than regular homeroom or during lunch were permitted if silent 
and made during moments of silence set aside for private meditation, while activities such as 
saying grace at lunchtime were not permitted.150 
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President Trump’s January 2020 Executive Order safeguarding the right to religious 
freedom for students and organizations evidences the continued protection of students’ rights to 
practice religion in school.151 The order maintains that to receive Federal funds, public educational 
agencies must confirm that their policies do not prevent or interfere with the constitutionally-
protected rights outlined in the guidance.152 The guidance also provides that students can read 
religious texts or pray during recess and other non-instructional periods, organize prayer groups, 
and express their religious beliefs in their assignments.153 While there remains a need for the divide 
between Church and State, following the framework laid out by the Supreme Court lower courts 
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